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As the World Economic Forum meeting convened in Davos in January 2017, 
headlines were dominated by reports from Oxfam which laid bare the startling—
and growing—scale of inequality in the global political economy. Continuing a 
theme of its research over several years, Oxfam presented updated figures showing 
that the eight richest billionaires in the world controlled more wealth than the 
poorest 50 per cent of the world’s total population.1 The corresponding figure 
for 2016 had been the 62 richest people, revealing an acceleration of inequality 
over the year stemming mainly from increases in poverty levels in China and 
India.2 International organizations tell us that dramatic progress was made in the 
alleviation of extreme poverty between 1990 and 2015, estimating that over that 
period the number of people living in extreme poverty (defined as income of 
US$1.25 a day or less) fell by slightly more than half of the 1990 figure to under 
10 per cent of the global population.3 However, these aggregate figures hide the 
very uneven nature of improvements across the world. Outside China, progress 
has been patchy, and an overall decline in extreme poverty has not been sufficient 
to reduce the total number of people living in such conditions. Perhaps most 
significantly, while there has been a drop in extreme poverty, there has been much 
less progress on poverty in general: in fact, between 1981 and 2008 the number of 
people living on daily incomes between the $1.25 extreme poverty line and the $2 
per day poverty line doubled.4 
* This article is an adapted version of the 2016 Martin Wight Memorial Lecture, delivered on 9 November 
2016 at the London School of Economics and Political Science. I am sincerely grateful to the Martin Wight 
Memorial Trust and the LSE for their invitation and generous hospitality, and to International Affairs for the 
opportunity to publish this revised version.
1 Deborah Hardoon, ‘An economy for the 99%: it’s time to build a human economy that benefits everyone, not 
just the privileged few’, Oxfam Briefing Papers, 16 Jan. 2017, http://policy-practice.oxfam.org.uk/publica-
tions/an-economy-for-the-99-its-time-to-build-a-human-economy-that-benefits-everyone-620170. (Unless 
otherwise noted at point of citation, all URLs cited in this article were accessible on 25 Jan. 2017.) 
2 Oxfam, ‘62 people own same as half world’, press release, 16 Jan. 2016, http://www.oxfam.org.uk/media-
centre/press-releases/2016/01/62-people-own-same-as-half-world-says-oxfam-inequality-report-davos-
world-economic-forum; Larry Elliott, ‘World’s eight richest people have same wealth as poorest 50%’, 
Guardian, 16 Jan. 2017.
3 World Bank, ‘World Bank forecasts global poverty to fall below 10% for first time; major hurdles remain 
in goal to end poverty by 2030’, press release, 4 Oct. 2015, http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-
release/2015/10/04/world-bank-forecasts-global-poverty-to-fall-below-10-for-first-time-major-hurdles-
remain-in-goal-to-end-poverty-by-2030; UN Development Program, The Millennium Development Goals 
Report 2015 (New York, 2015).
4 World Bank, ‘An update to the World Bank’s estimates of consumption poverty in the developing world’, 
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A monumental body of scholarly research has traced trends in inequality over 
time and across the world,5 engaging in energetic empirical and theoretical work 
seeking to understand the drivers behind these vast socio-economic disparities, 
which some time ago Jan Nederveen Pieterse rightly described as being ‘without 
historical precedent and without conceivable justification—economic, moral or 
otherwise’,6 and which are now playing out politically in seismic and traumatic 
ways. Not least for that reason, the task is one of ever greater urgency. My 
contribution to this effort here focuses on a dimension of the picture which has 
received surprisingly little attention: namely, the implications for socio-economic 
inequality of the particular form of industrial organization that has come to 
underpin the contemporary global economy—one organized around the struc-
tures of global value chains (GVCs) and global production networks (GPNs).7
The GVC/GPN concepts refer to a pattern of global and regional production, 
coordinated and controlled by transnational corporations (TNCs), that is both 
functionally and geographically fragmented.8 In the functional fragmentation of 
the production process, trade is no longer about the international exchange of 
final goods, but rather about intermediate goods and services, or ‘trade in tasks’.9 
Functional fragmentation is associated with geographic fragmentation, as lead 
firms progressively outsource and/or offshore productive functions, shaping new 
global and regional patterns of specialization, and a new global politics of distri-
bution. It has become widely accepted that we are now living in what we could 
call a ‘GVC world’.10 For one group of observers, GVCs have become no less than 
‘the world economy’s backbone and central nervous system’.11 The 2013 World 
Investment Report, published by the United Nations Commission on Trade and 
briefing note, 29 Feb. 2012, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPOVCALNET/Resources/Global_
Poverty_Update_2012_02-29-12.pdf.
5 As a tiny selection of examples: Charles Tilly, Durable inequality (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 
1998); Branko Milanovic, The haves and the have nots: a brief and idiosyncratic history of global inequality (New York: Basic 
Books, 2001); Robert Wade, ‘Is globalization reducing poverty and inequality?’, World Development 32: 4, 2004, pp. 
567–89; Thomas Piketty, Capital in the twenty-first century (Cambridge, MA: Belknap/ Harvard University Press, 
2014); Anthony B. Atkinson, Inequality: what can be done? (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015).
6 Jan Nederveen Pieterse, ‘Global inequality: bringing politics back in’, Third World Quarterly 23: 6, 2002, p. 1024.
7 The choice of conceptual labels in this debate is, as ever, contentious, and in my view the differences between 
the GVC and GPN approaches are overstated in ways that impede their common endeavour. While it will not 
please advocates of each set of terms, I use them here essentially interchangeably, usually preferring GVC as 
a shorthand for the structures in question, and more often GVC/GPN to connote the field of study.
8 For important statements in the field displaying a range of conceptual preferences, see Gary Gereffi, ‘The organ-
ization of buyer-driven global commodity chains: how US retailers shape overseas production networks’, in 
Gary Gereffi and Miguel Korzeniewicz, eds, Commodity chains and global capitalism (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1994), 
pp. 95–122; Jeffrey Henderson, Peter Dicken, Martin Hess, Neil Coe and Henry Wai-Chung Yeung, ‘Global 
production networks and the analysis of economic development’, Review of International Political Economy 9: 3, 
2002, pp. 436–64; Jennifer Bair, ed., Frontiers of commodity chain research (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 
2009); William Milberg and Deborah Winkler, Outsourcing economics: global value chains in capitalist development 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).
9 Gene Grossman and Esteban Rossi-Hansberg, ‘Trading tasks: a simple theory of offshoring’, American Economic 
Review 98: 5, 2008, pp. 1978–97.
10 Frederick W. Mayer, Nicola Phillips and Anne Posthuma, eds, symposium on ‘The political economy of 
governance in a “global value chain world”’, New Political Economy, Jan. 2017, doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/
13563467.2016.1273343.
11 Olivier Cattaneo, Gary Gereffi and Cornelia Staritz, ‘Global value chains in a post-crisis world: resilience, 
consolidation and shifting end markets’, in Olivier Cattaneo, Gary Gereffi and Cornelia Staritz, eds, Global 
value chains in a post-crisis world: a development perspective (Washington DC: World Bank, 2010), p. 7.
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Development, estimates that around 80 per cent of global trade now flows through 
GVCs led by TNCs.12 The International Labour Organization estimates that one 
in five jobs worldwide is linked to production in GVCs.13 Virtually all of the major 
international organizations focused on economic development have picked up and 
actively deploy, in different ways, the concept and language of GVCs, in parallel 
with national governments across the developing world.14 We have in this sense 
reached a point where it can plausibly be suggested that ‘the goal of industrial 
upgrading within GVCs has become nearly synonymous with economic develop-
ment itself ’.15
To the extent that the broad field of international political economy has been 
somewhat slow to embrace what has become a voluminous scholarly and policy 
debate on GVCs/GPNs, it is perhaps inevitable that the associated dynamics of a 
‘GVC world’ have rarely been linked up to the otherwise vibrant debates about 
inequality that have flourished in our field over the years. Yet, from the other angle, 
much of the GVC/GPN literature also displays strikingly little direct concern with 
the question of inequality, despite aspirations in some parts of the field to move 
beyond the terrain of economic coordination between firms towards what we 
might see as a more encompassing and critical political economy of GVCs/GPNs. 
Indeed, it has been observed for some time that GVC/GPN scholarship has been 
‘converging with more conventional approaches to competitiveness and losing 
touch with [its] more critical origins’,16 notwithstanding honourable exceptions 
to this generalization. 
Against this backdrop, my focus in this article is on how the dynamics of a global 
economy dominated by GVCs/GPNs contribute to the patterns of inequality that 
we observe across the world. My intention is to demonstrate that inequality is 
not a ‘bug in the system’ of a GVC world;17 rather, the foundational dynamics 
of a global economy organized in this manner directly produce these outcomes, 
on the one hand, and on the other depend on the harnessing of existing inequali-
ties for their ability to emerge and thrive. To put the point slightly differently, 
global patterns of inequality are critical to understanding how the GVC world 
was enabled to come into being from the 1970s onwards, and how it continues 
to serve the powerful economic and political interests which benefit from this 
form of global economic organization. Conversely, the nature and functioning 
of the GVC world are central to understanding the drivers of the patterns of 
inequality that we have observed being consolidated over this period of time, and 
by extension to understanding the political and economic juncture at which we 
12 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), World Investment Report 2013. Global value 
chains: investment and trade for development (Geneva, 2013).
13 International Labour Organization, World employment social outlook: the changing nature of jobs (Geneva, 2015).
14 Gary Gereffi, ‘Global value chains in a post-Washington Consensus world’, Review of International Political 
Economy 21: 1, 2014, pp. 9–37.
15 Milberg and Winkler, Outsourcing economics, p. 238.
16 David Levy, ‘Political contestation in global production networks’, Academy of Management Review 33: 4, 2008, 
p. 951; Jennifer Bair, ‘Global capitalism and commodity chains: looking back, going forward’, Competition and 
Change 9: 2, 2005, pp. 153–80.
17 Frederick W. Mayer and Nicola Phillips, ‘Outsourcing governance: states and the politics of a “global value 
chain world”’, New Political Economy, 4 Jan. 2017, p. 13, doi: 10.1080/13563467.2016.1273341.
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find ourselves at the start of 2017, dominated by an emphatic shifting of domestic 
and international political sands.
Strands of the GVC/GPN literature offer a valuable starting-point for this enter-
prise, in their recognition that this particular form of global industrial organiza-
tion is founded on corporate strategies to harness significant global asymmetries of 
market power in the interests of generating and capturing profit.18 GVCs, in other 
words, exist for a reason: they enable lead firms to mobilize and exploit vastly 
asymmetrical power relations between firms and other actors within value chains, 
in order to control how, where and by whom value is created, and how, where 
and by whom it is captured. The mobilization of these asymmetrical relations of 
market power to produce a global economy marked by significant concentrations 
of wealth and assets is now amply documented.19 
My suggestion here is nevertheless that this focus on market power remains too 
limited to serve as the basis for a broader understanding of how inequalities are 
produced and reproduced in a GVC world. I propose instead an approach which 
sees inequality as arising at the intersections of three dimensions of asymmetry in 
the power relations that crystallize in and around GVCs—asymmetries of market 
power, asymmetries of social power, and asymmetries of political power. Asym-
metries of market power refer to the relative positions of firms within GVC struc-
tures, characterized by oligopoly power among lead firms and intense competition 
among supplier firms,20 and the ways in which these positions correspond with 
degrees of control over production and the capture of value. Asymmetries of social 
power refer to wider patterns of poverty, wealth and inequality in the societal 
contexts in which GVCs are rooted, as well as between actors within GVCs, and 
how forms of social power are mobilized to reinforce these patterns. Asymmetries 
of political power refer to the wider political dynamics which shape the govern-
ance of GVCs, highlighting the interactions between political interests in shaping 
the governance of GVCs, and by extension their social underpinnings, at the local, 
regional and global scales. These three dimensions of asymmetry are depicted in 
stylized terms in figure 1, and the task is to capture how these dimensions interlock 
and intersect to produce observed patterns of socio-economic inequality. 
Such an approach opens up an expansive set of questions and an expansive 
terrain for research, both of which far exceed the possible remit for a single article. 
I therefore wish to take a microcosm of these dynamics, exploring in necessarily 
illustrative terms what this triangle looks like, in theory and in practice, in the 
particular arena of labour and labour exploitation in GVCs. Labour relations are 
key to understanding the dynamics of value creation and capture in GVCs, in 
terms both of wealth concentration and of poverty and vulnerability. This focus 
accordingly sheds a valuable wide-angle beam on the big questions of power and 
inequality in the contemporary global political economy. By taking each of these 
dimensions of asymmetry in turn and exploring their interactions, I hope to eluci-
18 Milberg and Winkler, Outsourcing economics; Raphael Kaplinsky, Globalization, poverty and inequality (Cambridge: 
Polity, 2005). 
19 Milberg and Winkler, Outsourcing economics; Mayer and Phillips, ‘Outsourcing governance’.
20 Milberg and Winkler, Outsourcing economics, p. 103.
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date how the evolution of GVCs constitutes a critically important means through 
which socio-economic inequality has become a defining feature of the contempo-
rary global political economy. 
Asymmetries of market power
Figure 2 (overleaf ), depicting the distribution of value in the production of 
Apple’s iPhone, tells us at a single glance much of what we need to know about 
where value is created and captured in GVCs, and by whom or what. What jumps 
out immediately is that more than half of the total value, across the whole of the 
production process, is captured by the lead firm—Apple—as profit. The figures 
for labour costs, by contrast, offer an insight into both the relationship between 
capital and labour in the global economy, and the relative proportions of value 
that are captured by each. The costs of materials involved in production are vastly 
greater than the human input costs associated with labour. The proportion of 
profits flowing to the principal countries in which the iPhone is produced are 
insignificant compared with the profits that flow to a single private company—in 
the language of GVCs/GPNs, the ‘lead firm’.
It is well known that the iPhone value chain stretches across a wide range of 
geographic locations, with the largest concentration of suppliers being in east Asia. 
Yet conventional depictions of the value chain tend to focus only on its upper 
tiers, specifically on registered factories and the increasingly powerful giant supplier 
firms in east Asia, of which Foxconn is the most notable in the electronics sector.21 
The value chain in reality encompasses thousands of firms and enterprises which 
are involved in production for Apple, but are not registered suppliers and have no 
formal relationship with Apple. Very often these will be subcontractors to the first- 
or second-tier supplier firms, or informal units operating way down in the least 
21 Richard P. Appelbaum, ‘Giant transnational contractors in east Asia: emergent trends in global supply chains’, 
Competition and Change 12: 1, 2008, pp. 69–87; Jenny Chan, Pun Ngai and Mark Selden, ‘Apple, Foxconn and 
China’s new working class’, in Richard P. Appelbaum and Nelson Lichtenstein, eds, Achieving workers’ rights in 
the global economy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2016), pp. 173–89.
Asymmetries of 
market power 
Asymmetries of 
political power 
Asymmetries of 
social power 
Figure 1: The political economy of global value chains
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visible parts of the value chain. These extend to the tiers associated with the produc-
tion of raw materials for the electronics industry, which in mobile phone produc-
tion notably include the mineral coltan. It is notable that these arenas of production 
are almost always excluded from depictions of value chains, and frequently also 
from firms’ own definitions of the scope of their supply chains. This is especially so 
in those value chains characterized by relationships between firms based on arm’s-
length subcontracting arrangements, as distinct from those organized around direct 
ownership and control by the lead firm of a network of affiliated entities. Indeed, 
the length and complexity of value chains organized around subcontracting, in 
electronics and many other sectors, mean that productive activities in the lower tiers 
are in every sense removed from the world of first-tier suppliers and lead firms. It 
is especially common for workers in the lower tiers of the value chain, particularly 
in informal units and home settings, to be entirely unaware of the final destinations 
of the products they contribute to producing, or of which lead firm or supplier 
firm controls the production process in which they participate.
Starting with the illustrative iPhone example helps to underline the core point 
that the globalization of production along these lines is no accident: GVCs have 
been purposefully constructed by powerful economic and political interests to 
bring about a particular model of globalized production. We have already estab-
lished that this pattern of production is driven by lead firms seeking to create and 
harness significant global asymmetries of market power in the interests of gener-
ating and capturing profit, facilitated and buttressed by states and other political 
actors. With the maturing of GVCs, it has come to be firms, not states, that now 
play the major role in determining what will be produced where and on what 
terms, and what will be traded on what terms. So, to a great extent, global patterns 
Figure 2: Distribution of value for the iPhone, 2010
Source: Kenneth L. Kraemer, Greg Linden and Jason Dedrick, ‘Capturing value in global 
networks: Apple’s iPad and iPhone’, July 2011, http://pcic.merage.uci.edu/papers/2011/
value_ipad_iphone.pdf; reproduced with permission. 
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of production that were once strongly shaped by constellations of state policies are 
now artefacts of value-chain governance. States are, though, by no means passive 
bystanders: on the contrary, along with powerful corporate interests, they have 
been architects of the GVC world, providing facilitative governance functions 
ranging across trade policy, development policy, corporate tax policy, competi-
tion policy and other areas.22
Competition policy is perhaps particularly significant. The loosening of 
competition policy across the world reflects the much greater political tolerance 
of the high levels of market concentration and the high levels of market power 
that characterize lead firms in GVCs, and as a consequence the trends of massive 
wealth concentration which form a core feature of the global political economy 
of inequality. The increasing concentration of market power is apparent in many 
sectors. Examples include retailing (Walmart, Amazon, Alibaba), office software 
and operating systems (Microsoft), smartphones (Apple and Samsung), large 
commercial aircraft (Boeing and Airbus), soft drinks (Coca-Cola) and credit card 
networks (Visa and MasterCard).23 A key policy support underpinning this trend 
is the expansion of intellectual property protections, particularly in the high-
technology sector.24 
The consolidation and mobilization of these market asymmetries rests on 
securing a structure of production in which a small number of very large firms at 
the top, in many cases the branded retailers, occupy oligopolistic positions—that 
is, positions of market dominance, and in which the lower tiers of production 
are characterized by densely populated and intensely competitive markets.25 In 
the context of high levels of market concentration, asymmetry of market power 
is entrenched by the simple fact that suppliers face limited numbers of buyers 
for their goods, lending to those lead firms a form of monopsony power, while 
buyers often have many potential suppliers and are able to use their market power 
to generate intense competition between supplier firms, particularly on conditions 
of price and supply.26 
Producers’ and suppliers’ strategies to manage these commercial pressures 
frequently rest on the mechanisms of labour costs and labour practices, especially 
in the most labour-intensive and price-sensitive sectors. Especially where required 
quality standards are high, labour becomes the key arena for input cost reduc-
tion; equally, in sectors where the key requirement is flexibility in the face of 
significant commercial risk (whether for reasons of seasonal dynamics or highly 
22 Mayer and Phillips, ‘Outsourcing governance’, pp. 9–10.
23 Mayer and Phillips, ‘Outsourcing governance’, p. 9; see e.g. Milberg and Winkler, Outsourcing economics; Peter 
Nolan, Dylan Sutherland and Zhang Jin, ‘The challenge of the global business revolution’, Contributions to 
Political Economy 21: 1, 2002, pp. 91–110; Jacob A. Bikker and Katharina Haaf, ‘Competition, concentration and 
their relationship: an empirical analysis of the banking industry’, Journal of Banking and Finance 26: 11, 2002, 
pp. 2191–214; UNCTAD, Tracking the trend towards market concentration: the case of the agricultural input industry 
(Geneva, 2006).
24 William E. Kovacic, ‘From Microsoft to Google: intellectual property, high technology, and the reorientation 
of US competition policy and practice’, Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law Journal 23: 2, 
2012, pp. 645–54.
25 Milberg and Winkler, Outsourcing economics, pp. 123–4.
26 Mayer and Phillips, ‘Outsourcing governance’, p. 9.
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variable commercial conditions), business models are built around the aggressive 
management of labour supply, conditions and wages. This is particularly the case 
where incentives imposed by external stakeholders to adhere to labour and social 
standards are low: for the vast population of ‘invisible’ firms and entrepreneurs in 
the informal economy in sectors such as garments, the incentives they face point in 
precisely the opposite direction, particularly as their share of the consumer market 
rests on cut-throat price competition.27 Lead firms and lead suppliers, equally, are 
apt to pursue locational strategies which permit access to such environments for 
production. Firms in price-sensitive and labour-intensive sectors, as well as firms 
which rely on retail strategies, prefer less stringent regulation and will go to some 
lengths to secure those conditions.28
The consequence across the world has been the explosive growth of precarious, 
insecure and exploitative work in global production, performed by a workforce 
significantly made up of informal, migrant, contract and female workers,29 and 
extending at the end of the spectrum to the purposeful use of forced labour.30 
To return to our illustrative example of Apple, documented and highly publi-
cized conditions in its value chains illustrate some of the forms that exploita-
tion takes. We know that diverse forms of labour exploitation are embedded in 
Apple’s supply chains and those of other electronics producers, not least from a 
steady flow of revelations about the use of forced labour, unpaid student intern 
labour and child labour in supplier factories for Apple, Samsung, HP, Dell and 
other firms.31 When we trace labour conditions in the value chain, we encounter 
the famous ‘dormitory’ system in China,32 where workers are often confined 
to factories and obliged to live in factory accommodation, not least to facilitate 
27 Peter Knorringa, ‘Private governance and social legitimacy in production’, in Anthony Payne and Nicola Phil-
lips, eds, The handbook of the international political economy of governance (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2014), p. 368.
28 Luc Fransen and Brian Burgoon, ‘A market for worker rights: explaining business support for international 
private labour regulation’, Review of International Political Economy 19: 2, 2012, pp. 236–66.
29 See, for a flavour of a huge literature: Alejandro Portes, Manuel Castells and Lauren A. Benton, eds, The 
informal economy: studies in advanced and less developed countries (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1989); Ulrich Beck, The brave new world of work (Cambridge: Polity, 2000); Melissa Wright, Disposable women and 
other myths of global capitalism (London: Routledge, 2006); Matt Davies and Magnus Ryner, eds, Poverty and the 
production of world politics: unprotected workers in the global economy (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2006); Marcus Taylor, 
ed., Global economy contested: power and conflict across the international division of labour (London: Routledge, 2008); 
Judy Fudge and Kendra Strauss, eds, Temporary work, agencies, and unfree labour: insecurity in the world of work 
(London: Routledge, 2013); Louise Waite, Gary Craig, Hannah Lewis and Klara Skrivankova, eds, Vulner-
ability, exploitation and migrants: insecure work in a global economy (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2015).
30 Andrew Crane, ‘Modern slavery as a management practice: exploring the conditions and capabilities for 
human exploitation’, Academy of Management Review 38: 1, 2013, pp. 45–69; Nicola Phillips, ‘Unfree labour 
and adverse incorporation in the global economy: comparative perspectives from Brazil and India’, Economy 
and Society 42: 2, 2013, pp. 171–96.
31 As a tiny sample: ‘Apple admits it has a human rights problem’, Independent, 14 Feb. 2012; ‘Apple faces its “Nike 
moment” over working conditions in Chinese factories’, Guardian, 20 Feb. 2012; ‘Child labour uncovered in 
Apple’s supply chain’, Guardian, 25 Jan. 2013; China Labor Watch, Apple’s unkept promises: cheap iPhones come 
at high costs to Chinese workers (Hong Kong, 29 July 2013); Aditya Chakrabortty, ‘Forced student labour is 
central to the Chinese economic miracle’, Guardian, 14 Oct. 2013; ‘Apple bans “bonded servitude” for factory 
workers’, BBC News, 12 Feb. 2015; ‘Dell’s China suppliers “break employment laws with illegal labour condi-
tions”’, Telegraph, 5 Nov. 2013; ‘Brazil sues Samsung over labour violations’, Guardian, 14 Aug. 2013; ‘Samsung 
contractor suspended over child labor allegations’, New York Times, 14 July 2014; ‘Hewlett Packard directs its 
suppliers in China to limit student labor’, New York Times, 7 Feb. 2013.
32 Pun Ngai and Chris Smith, ‘Putting transna tional labour in its place: the dormitory labour regime in post-
socialist China’, Work, Employment and Society 21: 1, 2007, pp. 27–45.
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compulsory overtime; they are usually locked in at night, and work in what in 
the garment sector are often referred to as ‘sweatshop’ conditions. Exploitation 
and forced labour are also rife way down the value chain in the production of raw 
materials. Mining for coltan in the Congo and other parts of Africa and South 
America is strongly associated with human rights abuses and forced labour; coltan 
mining is essentially unregulated, and often also illegal and/or associated with 
illicit trade and smuggling.33
Conditions such as these in global production are often depicted as being a 
problem in and of the ‘developing’ world. We are used to focusing on conditions 
in garment factories in Bangladesh, electronics factories in Taiwan, horticulture 
in South Africa or the cut flowers industry in Ecuador. Labour flexibilization and 
the erosion of labour standards in what are traditionally thought of as the more 
advanced industrial economies are amply observed and theorized, but in debates 
that tend to be remote from the concerns with global production and GVCs/
GPNs. Yet, particularly in retail, the dynamics of GVCs extend to geographic and 
social locations that are not generally included in this literature, in North America 
or Europe, where they bring about parallel trends associated with offshoring strat-
egies, labour practices involving pressure on wages, contracts and conditions, and 
an appreciable incidence of forced labour. Migrant workers in these locations are 
especially vulnerable to the forms of exploitation that are generally documented 
in ‘developing-country’ locations within GVCs. All of these phenomena shape 
patterns of inequality in these contexts, both in terms of how existing inequalities 
facilitate these practices, and in terms of the inequalities that their outcomes act 
to produce or reinforce.
We must nevertheless beware of excessive generalization. It is important to 
recognize that these patterns of exploitation and abuses of labour rights are not 
uniform or universal in global production, and that a great deal of contingency 
attaches to the nature and structure of the value chain, patterns of ownership, the 
type and condition of the labour market, the political environment and institu-
tional context, the form that public and private governance initiatives take, the 
nature of end consumer markets, and the possibilities for labour agency. Impres-
sive empirical research has sought to document these patterns of contingency, and 
develop propositions about where, when and under what circumstances labour 
rights and standards are more likely to be protected, and where, when and under 
what circumstances they are more likely to be violated.34 It is in this sense unsat-
isfactory simply to assert that GVCs are always and everywhere associated with 
a ‘race to the bottom’ type of logic which creates or entrenches inequality in 
identical ways. 
33 Dev Nathan and Sandip Sarkar, Blood on your mobile phone? Capturing the gains for artisanal miners, poor work-
ers and women, Capturing the Gains Briefing Note no. 2, Feb. 2011, http://www.capturingthegains.org/pdf/
ctg_briefing_note_02.pdf. 
34 As important contributions, including excellent overviews of these debates, see Layna Mosley, Multinational 
production and labor rights (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Layna Mosley and David Singer, 
‘Migration, labor and the international political economy’, Annual Review of Political Science 18, 2015, pp. 
283–301; Layna Mosley, ‘Workers’ rights in global value chains: possibilities for protection and for peril’, 
New Political Economy, 4 Jan. 2017, pp. 1–16, doi: 10.1080/13563467.2016.1273339.
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Nevertheless, we have established here a case for a foundational understanding 
of GVCs as purposefully constructed to facilitate the mobilization of asymmetries 
of market power by lead firms in order to create and capture value or profit, 
and of labour exploitation as arising within and from the ‘normal processes of 
power within production’.35 We have an insight into the disjunctures between 
where, how and by whom or what value is created, and captured, in the global 
economy—in other words, into how commercial dynamics in GVCs create and 
deepen socio-economic inequalities across the world through the twin mecha-
nisms of facilitating the massive concentration of market power and enabling the 
proliferation of business models founded on exploitative labour strategies. At the 
same time, these inequalities are not simply outcomes, as they are often under-
stood to be in debates about labour standards. Rather, echoing an insight well 
established in classical theories of political economy, the advance of production 
depends on a set of prior enabling conditions of inequality—and this brings us to 
the second dimension of the triangular structure depicted in figure 1.
Asymmetries of social power
How do these enabling social asymmetries come about, and what forms do they 
take? There are three aspects that deserve attention. The first is a well-recognized 
structural trend, which has been called by Richard Freeman the ‘great doubling’ 
of the world’s labour force as a result of the entry into the global economy of 
China, India and the former Soviet bloc nations during the 1990s.36 On the tide 
of political change in those countries, along with the accelerating liberalization 
of the global economy and demographic trends, Freeman estimated the size of 
the global labour pool to have increased from approximately 1.46 billion to 2.93 
billion workers between 2000 and 2010, generating a ‘global readjustment of 
labour and capital’. 
The second aspect is the parallel trend in adoption of a policy framework 
designed to facilitate the liberalization and deregulation processes associated with 
globalization, condensed into the shorthand of ‘labour flexibilization’. Across the 
world, as much in the United Kingdom and United States as in India, Argentina, 
Mexico or South Africa, new laws were passed to dismantle previous regimes 
of worker protections and to provide employers with maximum flexibility in 
handling labour. At the same time, existing welfare state structures were disman-
tled or scaled back, leading to an explosion in casual, precarious work, the celebra-
tion of ‘disposability’ as the core attribute of this new global workforce,37 and the 
global problem not only of unemployment but of under-employment.
In a contribution in 1976, Robert W. Cox identified a new threefold social 
configuration, dominated by a ‘transnational managerial class’ at its apex, beneath 
which stood a large class of ‘established labour’ in what at the time was beginning 
35 Jeffrey Harrod, Power, production, and the unprotected worker (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), p. 4.
36 Richard Freeman, ‘The great doubling: the challenge of the new global labor market’, Aug. 2006, http://
emlab.berkeley.edu/users/webfac/eichengreen/e183_sp07/great_doub.pdf.
37 Wright, Disposable women.
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to be understood as the primary labour market and finally the group of ‘social 
marginals’ who were either excluded from industrial production or integrated 
into the secondary labour market through markedly precarious forms of employ-
ment.38 Today, while a proportion of Cox’s ‘social marginals’ may well exist in 
conditions of exclusion from employment in global production, a far greater 
proportion is now integrated into it, recalling the ILO estimate mentioned above 
that one in five jobs worldwide are now connected to GVCs.39
It was also noted above that recent figures on global poverty indicate a decline 
in extreme poverty on aggregate, but a marked ‘bunching up’ of the numbers of 
people living between the US$1.25 per day extreme poverty line and the US$2 
per day poverty line. This expanding population is largely comprised of the global 
working poor—a category that orthodox economic and development policy 
thinking has long struggled to accommodate, as work is envisaged in this thinking 
as the route out of poverty and the key to poverty reduction. The question of 
marginality in this sense has never been more pronounced or pressing; but the 
marginality stems as much from the terms of inclusion in global economic activity 
as from conditions of exclusion. The concept of ‘adverse incorporation’ has been 
useful in understanding these patterns and the question of how inclusion in global 
economic activity can for many people act to create or reinforce their chronic 
poverty rather than alleviate it.40
The third aspect of particular relevance relates to the inequalities which stem 
from migration. Migrant labour was identified above as one of the most important 
constituencies in this new global labour force—and here, obviously, our interest 
is in the low-paid, low-skill segments of the labour force, which are also signifi-
cantly feminized in many sectors. The dynamics of precarious employment and 
adverse incorporation are magnified by the particular vulnerabilities of migrant 
workers, especially where they are working in the informal economy. Migrant 
workers lack the power to engage in political action around wages and conditions, 
and they lack the rights and entitlements associated with citizenship or residency. 
Laws governing immigration or internal movements also often act to strip these 
workers of labour or welfare protections, constrain their ability to seek satisfac-
tory working conditions by changing employers, and provide mechanisms that 
employers can use to manipulate them, particularly perhaps when the worker is 
undocumented, such as the threat of denunciation to immigration authorities. 
Forced labour and child labour are strongly, although not exclusively, associated 
with the inequalities which attach to the migrant labour force.41 Hence we see a 
38 Robert Cox, ‘Labor and the multinationals’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 54, Jan. 1976, pp. 351–2.
39 Nicola Phillips, ‘Labour in global production: reflections on Coxian insights in a world of global value chains’, 
Globalizations, 5 Feb. 2016, doi: 10.1080/14747731.2016.1138608.
40 See e.g. Geoffrey Wood, ‘Staying secure, staying poor: the “Faustian bargain”’, World Development 31: 3, 2000, 
pp. 455–71; Sam Hickey and Andries du Toit, ‘Adverse incorporation, social exclusion and chronic poverty’, 
Chronic Poverty Research Centre Working Papers no. 81 (Manchester, 2007); Stefano Ponte, ‘Developing 
a “vertical” dimension to chronic poverty research: some lessons from global value chain analysis’, Chronic 
Poverty Research Centre Working Papers no. 111 (Manchester, 2008); Nicola Phillips, ‘Informality, global 
production networks and the dynamics of “adverse incorporation”’, Global Networks 11: 3, 2011, pp. 380–97.
41 Phillips, ‘Unfree labour’; Waite et al., Vulnerability.
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complex nexus of inequalities—political, social and economic—which reinforce 
the disproportionate likelihood that migrant workers will encounter the more 
severe forms of labour exploitation in GVCs.
These existing social inequalities provide the environment in which the commer-
cial dynamics within GVCs outlined in the previous section can flourish. In many 
sectors, particularly in the ‘lower’ tiers of GVCs, the globalization of production 
has been driven by lead firms pursuing locational advantages to manage and mini-
mize production costs, facilitated by the changing structures of global and local 
labour markets; subcontracting firms in turn mobilize these existing social inequali-
ties in order to construct and maintain a highly flexible workforce which is vulner-
able to relentless commercial pressure on wages and conditions. It can plausibly 
be hypothesized that these dynamics are most pronounced where labour is both 
abundant and relatively immobile, inasmuch as in these circumstances employers’ 
leverage is enhanced by the competition for jobs between workers, and with it the 
possibilities for exploitation are increased (including for the worst forms associated 
with forced labour). Conversely, where labour is scarce, employers are more likely 
to raise wages and improve conditions in order to attract and retain workers.42
A final layer in our discussion relates to the asymmetries of social power which 
come into play in generating these patterns of exploitation and inequality. What 
Charles Tilly called practices of ‘social categorization’ refer to the ways in which 
particular kinds of ‘markers’ are used to institutionalize and enable discrimination 
against and exploitation of particular groups of people. In Tilly’s theorization, 
the ‘inequality-generating mechanisms’ of social categorization relate to markers 
such as gender, age, race, ethnicity, caste, religion and so on, which are deployed 
by those who possess social power in order to control access to ‘value-producing 
resources’ and reserve their own monopoly in this respect.43 Such a perspective 
gives us an insight into how socio-economic inequalities are produced and repro-
duced by asymmetries of social power, which, in our context of GVCs, facilitate 
the patterns of exclusion and/or ‘adverse incorporation’ that are characteristic of 
many arenas of global production. It is through these mechanisms that inequality, 
in Tilly’s phrase, becomes durable, and often intergenerational: exclusion from 
access to value-producing resources and arenas of opportunity is perpetuated by 
the consequences of exploitation in GVCs, perhaps particularly in those forms 
associated with forced and child labour.44
Asymmetries of political power
Let us then take the argument on to the third point of the triangular scheme 
in figure 1, returning to our starting-point of the geographic fragmentation of 
global production. We have explored the business case for this kind of model 
42 Mosley and Singer, ‘Migration’, pp. 284–5.
43 Tilly, Durable inequality, pp. 7–8.
44 Nicola Phillips, Resmi Bhaskaran, Dev Nathan and C. Upendranadh, ‘The social foundations of global 
production networks: towards a global political economy of child labour’, Third World Quarterly 35: 3, 2014, 
pp. 428–46.
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and its social foundations, but now need to incorporate a more explicit recogni-
tion of the asymmetries of political power which underpin it. These asymmetries 
take many forms across diverse arenas of governance and policy, some of which 
(such as the governance of immigration and mobility) we have already touched 
on. Given constraint on space, this final section will focus on the politics of global 
business and regulation. 
We have established that the geographic fragmentation of production is driven 
in large part by the search of many firms in many sectors for permissive regula-
tory and political environments, particularly in relation to labour and environ-
mental standards. However, it is not simply that these conditions exist and firms 
take locational decisions on that basis. Rather, lead firms mobilize vast political 
power to create those conditions and ensure that they are maintained. In the 
competition to attract foreign investment and to increase their exports, many 
developing countries have incentives to be the low-cost point in GVCs. This, in 
turn, translates into incentives to limit regulatory costs for producers, as well as 
to keep wages ‘competitive’ and to restrict workers’ ability to organize. Similarly, 
enforcement mechanisms remain either underdeveloped or unimplemented. For 
many states, these outcomes emerge from the significant asymmetries of political 
and bargaining power that exist between their governments and transnational (and 
some local) firms. For others, the pressures of compulsion are less pronounced, but 
the competitive dynamics of the global economy and the demands of economic 
development push in the same direction, given additional impetus by the political 
power of transnational business.
Evidence of these political dynamics abounds. China’s Labour Contract Law of 
2008, for example, increased wages and protections for workers. A large number 
of big firms responded by moving their operations to sites in countries such as 
Vietnam or Cambodia where the regulatory environment remained even more 
permissive and labour costs even lower.45 We have documented evidence of a 
substantial increase over time in provisions built into bilateral investment treaties 
to protect the interests of foreign investors—wherein such investors are granted 
exemption from new labour laws, or guaranteed the payment of compensation by 
national governments if any such laws are enacted or amended. Similarly, a recent 
body of research associated with the generation of the United Nations’ Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights involved a survey of around 90 contracts 
for large-scale investment projects, which revealed that a majority of those drawn 
up with countries outside the OECD contained provisions to insulate or exempt 
investor firms from compliance with new social or environmental laws, or to facili-
tate compensation from national governments for the costs involved in complying 
with such legislation.46 Representatives of big business occupy seats in parliaments 
and congresses around the world, and use lobbying power to secure favourable 
legislation; their leverage is very strong over national governments in general, and 
45 Haiyan Wang, Richard P. Appelbaum, Francesca Degiuli and Nelson Lichtenstein, ‘China’s new labour 
contract law: is China moving towards increased power for workers?’, Third World Quarterly 30: 3, 2009, pp. 
485–501.
46 John G. Ruggie, Just business: multinational corporations and human rights (New York: Norton, 2013), pp. 86, 136.
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particularly over those whose bargaining power is weak. Arguments about political 
incentives against regulation are just as relevant to the more advanced economies as 
in the so-called developing world, where political dynamics between governments 
and big business, as well as ideological affinities between them, have substantially 
the same outcomes in terms of a retraction of regulation. 
In short, TNCs themselves push for the very ‘gaps’ in public governance that 
are necessary for their business models to thrive, working in tandem with some 
states and through forms of political compulsion over others. As indicated above, 
it is firms, not states, that now play the major role in determining what will be 
produced, where and on what terms, and what will be traded internationally. 
Specifically, firms also play a major role in determining how production will be 
regulated, including through labour and environmental standards. Jill Esben-
shade argued in 2004 that the new ‘triangle of power’ in the era of global supply 
chains (or, in our language, a GVC world) consisted of employers, contractors 
and government as the key points of the governance and regulatory landscape.47 
Others have argued that this overstates the role of government, and argue instead 
that the triangle is now composed of brands, their contract factories and the set of 
(western) non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that provide the pressure on 
firms to improve standards.48 In short, governance in a GVC world is observed to 
have shifted to private actors, and to have come to rest on the notions of corpo-
rate social responsibility (CSR) and voluntary self-regulation on the part of firms, 
ushering in a new era of ‘transnational private regulation’.49 In such a model, 
it is NGOs and consumers, not governments and states, that are responsible for 
holding commercial firms to account.50 We know that this model is not effective 
in improving standards, and an ample literature has emerged which highlights the 
shortcomings of private governance and CSR.51 
In consequence, the debate has recently shifted to an important and fascinating 
consideration of what kinds of governance initiatives, under what conditions, can 
make a difference in improving labour and other standards in the global economy, 
and what kinds of effective regulation can be conceived in the context of a world 
dominated by powerful business actors and the competitive dynamics of GVCs.52 
47 Jill Esbenshade, Monitoring sweatshops: workers, consumers, and the global apparel industry (Philadelphia: Temple 
University Press, 2004), p. 33. 
48 Richard P. Appelbaum and Nelson Lichtenstein, ‘Introduction: achieving workers’ rights in the global econ-
omy’, in Appelbaum and Lichtenstein, eds, Achieving workers’ rights, pp. 3–4.
49 Tim Bartley, ‘Institutional emergence in an era of globalization: the rise of transnational private regulation 
of labor and environmental conditions’, American Journal of Sociology 113: 2, 2007, pp. 297–351; Tim Büthe 
and Walter Mattli, The new global rulers: the privatization of regulation in the world economy (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2011).
50 Jill Esbenshade, ‘A review of private regulation: codes and monitoring in the apparel industry’, Sociology 
Compass 6: 7, 2012, p. 547; Kate MacDonald, The politics of global supply chains (Cambridge: Polity, 2014).
51 For a flavour, see Peter Newell, ‘Citizenship, accountability and community: the limits of the CSR agenda’, 
International Affairs 81: 3, May 2005, pp. 541–57; Cynthia Stohl, Michael Stohl and Lucy Popova, ‘A new 
generation of corporate codes of ethics’, Journal of Business Ethics 90: 607, 2009, pp. 607–22; David Vogel, ‘The 
private regulation of global corporate conduct: achievements and limitations’, Business and Society 49: 1, 2010, 
pp. 68–87; Esbenshade, ‘A review’; Richard Locke, The promise and limits of private power: promoting labor standards 
in a global economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013). 
52 See Locke, The promise; Daniel Berliner, Anne Regan Greenleaf, Milli Lake, Margaret Levi and Jennifer 
Noveck, Labor standards in international supply chains: aligning rights and incentives (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 
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Much has been made in particular of the combination of public and private 
governance that is deemed necessary to achieve these improvements, arguing for 
a continuation of the ‘regulatory renaissance’ that is thought to be under way in 
some parts of the world. At the same time it must not be forgotten that there are 
plentiful examples of firms that have engaged in meaningful responsibility and 
accountability initiatives with some positive outcomes, and that not all firms are 
engaged in strategies of continually seeking to circumvent or undermine public 
regulation. It is interesting that in Britain, during the process of drawing up the 
Modern Slavery Act of 2015, some businesses agitated for at least an element of 
government regulation inasmuch as they perceived a need for a level playing 
field in relation to labour practices. At the same time, the relentless pressure on 
electronics firms from media and NGOs, noted above, has led to some significant 
initiatives to address the problem of labour abuses in their value chains. While 
firms such as Apple have been open to challenge on how extensive, committed 
and/or effective these initiatives have been,53 nevertheless an element of at least 
ostensibly progressive activity by some private actors has to be recognized as an 
important part of the governance landscape.
A final caveat is in order. We have seen that a pervasive assumption remains 
that states and governments remain ‘absent’ in a GVC world, removed from the 
task of governance, and overwhelmed by the asymmetries of political power that 
have been documented, necessarily briefly, in this discussion. Such an assump-
tion is misleading: the state remains a core part of the political economy of 
governance, functioning as an architect of the GVC world, and is itself active 
in a politically purposeful process of delegating or ‘outsourcing’ governance to 
private actors.54 What may appear to be purely private forms of governance are 
always and everywhere underpinned by particular kinds of interactions with state 
authority and public governance.55 This does not mean that states and TNCs are 
politically united and serving the same cause, any more than we may assume that 
national states are simply overwhelmed by the asymmetries of political power 
that crystallize in and around GVCs. Some states are more politically willing than 
others to challenge big business, through regulation or other means. Similarly, 
intense political contestation occurs between states and firms, as they tussle for 
control over the terms of production and the value created in the global economy. 
Tax scandals represent one case-study of this contestation. Another is the tension 
between business and government in relation to immigration policy and its conse-
quences for labour supply. In relation to labour standards, there has emerged a 
2015); Appelbaum and Lichtenstein, eds, Achieving workers’ rights.
53 e.g. Scott Nova and Isaac Shapiro, ‘Polishing Apple: fair labor association gives Foxconn and Apple undue 
credit for labor rights progress’, EPI briefing paper no. 352 (Washington DC: Economic Policy Institute, 8 
Nov. 2012); Students and Scholars Against Corporate Misbehaviour, ‘FLA waters down rights violations at 
Apple Suppliers’, Hong Kong, 18 Feb. 2012, http://sacom.hk/archives/931.
54 Mayer and Phillips, ‘Outsourcing governance’.
55 Bartley, ‘Institutional emergence’; Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal, ‘The governance triangle: regula-
tory standards institutions and the shadow of the state’, in Walter Mattli and Ngaire Woods, eds, The politics 
of global regulation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), pp. 44–88; Paul Verbruggen, ‘Gorillas in the 
closet? Public and private actors in the enforcement of transnational private regulation’, Regulation and Govern-
ance 7: 4, 2013, pp. 512–32.
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politics of blame, where firms are apt to place responsibility on state regulation 
and blame its deficiencies, states are apt to insist that these are supply-chain issues, 
consumers receive appeals from each side, and workers continue to labour in 
conditions of systematic exploitation.
Asymmetries of political power thus form a critical part of the picture of 
how inequalities are produced and reproduced in a GVC world. Governance and 
politics matter, in short, and political power—both public and private—fuses in 
dynamic ways with market power and social power to produce the patterns of 
inequality in the global political economy that have been so amply observed over 
recent years. 
Conclusion
Inequality in all its forms is the defining global problem and increasingly the 
defining political problem of our age. At the time of writing in early 2017, public 
discourse had renewed its focus on inequality in an attempt to understand seismic 
events such as the UK’s referendum vote to leave the European Union, the election 
of Donald Trump as president of the United States, and the rise of the populist 
right in several countries. Questions of disadvantage, alienation and exclusion are 
all critical to this conjunction of events and trends. Yet a focus on those people and 
sections of society alienated from globalization and crushed by its distributional 
dynamics cannot capture the full complexity of the political moment in which 
we find ourselves. Equally relevant is the question of for whom the system works: 
how, politically, the opportunities are protected for the massive concentration of 
wealth, power and advantage that we have explored here, and how economic, 
social and political inequalities can be manipulated and created afresh for that 
purpose. 
Whether this means that we are seeing a significant crisis of capitalism, of an 
order which could usher in a substantively new order, remains an open question 
and one which deserves continued careful attention.56 I have argued here that the 
current vast and expanding extent of global inequality is not a ‘bug in the system’ 
of a GVC world, but is rather foundational to the functioning of a global political 
economy built around the form of industrial organization associated with GVCs—
an outcome that arises from the interactions of market, social and political power 
in underpinning this global economic order. To this extent, the inescapable conclu-
sion is that incremental change will not be sufficient to address the distributional 
implications of the GVC world. The nationalistic, nativistic response of the politi-
cal right in this context is deeply unpalatable and alarming to many, but has not 
yet been met with a coherent challenge from the centre or the left. A compelling 
vision is needed of a progressive, internationalist politics that is capable of address-
ing the issues of power and inequality in the global political economy which have 
led us to this juncture, and capable of producing a foundation for significantly more 
equitable and inclusive forms of growth and development.
56 Wolfgang Streeck, How will capitalism end? Essays on a failing system (London: Verso, 2016).
